we attack what
we build.
Most teams bolt security on after the model works. We treat it as the starting condition. Every system we ship is red-teamed against real threat classes, and you get the report.
BUILD IT · BREAK IT · DOCUMENT HOW IT HOLDS
real threats, named.
Specificity about attacks is what separates security research from “enterprise-grade security.” These are the classes we test against, every time.
Direct and indirect injection through user input, retrieved documents, and tool outputs. The most common way an agent is turned against its operator.
System-prompt and context exfiltration, training-data recall, and cross-tenant bleed. The model says what it shouldn't, to whom it shouldn't.
Guardrail bypass, role-play escapes, and policy circumvention against the model's intended use.
Excessive agency, unsafe tool chaining, and unscoped credentials, where an agent's actions reach further than they should.
Where you fine-tune or build a RAG corpus: poisoned sources, backdoors, and supply-chain integrity of the data itself.
Token-exhaustion, recursion, and resource-abuse paths that turn a helpful agent into a runaway bill.
the report is the point.
Threat model
A map of how your specific deployment can break, scoped to your data, tools, and users, not a generic checklist.
Findings, with severity
Each issue reproduced and rated against CVSS 3.1, with the attack path documented so your team can see exactly what we saw.
Remediation & re-test
Concrete fixes, then we attack it again to confirm the fix holds. The engagement closes on a re-test, not a report.
CISSP · ISO 27001 LEAD AUDITOR · ANTHROPIC CVP · CVSS 3.1
break it before an adversary does.
Tell us what you're shipping. We'll tell you how it could be turned against you.