00Security Research

we attack what
we build.

Most teams bolt security on after the model works. We treat it as the starting condition. Every system we ship is red-teamed against real threat classes, and you get the report.

BUILD IT · BREAK IT · DOCUMENT HOW IT HOLDS

01What we red-team

real threats, named.

Specificity about attacks is what separates security research from “enterprise-grade security.” These are the classes we test against, every time.

THREAT-01AML.T0051
Prompt injection

Direct and indirect injection through user input, retrieved documents and tool outputs. The most common way an agent is turned against its operator.

See the grade
THREAT-02AML.T0024
Data leakage

System-prompt and context exfiltration, training-data recall and cross-tenant bleed. The model says what it shouldn't, to whom it shouldn't.

See the grade
THREAT-03AML.T0015
Model abuse & jailbreaks

Guardrail bypass, role-play escapes and policy circumvention against the model's intended use.

See the grade
THREAT-04AML.T0051.i
Insecure tool use

Excessive agency, unsafe tool chaining and unscoped credentials, where an agent's actions reach further than they should.

See the grade
THREAT-05AML.T0020
Training-data poisoning

Where you fine-tune or build a RAG corpus: poisoned sources, backdoors and supply-chain integrity of the data itself.

See the grade
THREAT-06AML.T0029
Denial & cost abuse

Token-exhaustion, recursion and resource-abuse paths that turn a helpful agent into a runaway bill.

See the grade
02Published Research

the threat map is public.

Every class above sits on a larger map. The LLM ATT&CK navigator is our living matrix of AI-enabled threats — 50 techniques across MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATLAS, each graded 0–4 for the uplift current models actually give an adversary. The same map we red-team against, published in full.

Open the navigator
LLM ATT&CK NAVIGATOR · LIVE GRADES
T1566PhishingCRITICAL
AML.T0051Prompt InjectionCRITICAL
T1027Polymorphic CodeCRITICAL
T1585Synthetic PersonasCRITICAL
T1102LLM API as C2HIGH
AML.RAGRAG PoisoningHIGH
EXPLORE ALL 50 TECHNIQUES
03The deliverable

the report is the point.

01

Threat model

A map of how your specific deployment can break, scoped to your data, tools and users, not a generic checklist.

02

Findings, with severity

Each issue reproduced and rated against CVSS 3.1, with the attack path documented so your team can see exactly what we saw.

03

Remediation & re-test

Concrete fixes, then we attack it again to confirm the fix holds. The engagement closes on a re-test, not a report.

CISSP · ISO 27001 LEAD AUDITOR · ANTHROPIC CVP · CVSS 3.1

break it before an adversary does.

Tell us what you're shipping. We'll tell you how it could be turned against you.

Request a Red-Team Scope